The Sensitivity of the Effect Of On-the-Job Training on Employment Outcomes in Experimental and Non-Experimental Settings by Gorenca, Ana & Kuro, Theodhor
ISSN: 2065-0175                                                                                              ŒCONOMICA 
141 
 
 
The Sensitivity of the Effect of on-the-Job Training on Employment 
Outcomes in Experimental and Non-Experimental Settings 
 
Ana Gorenca1, Theodhor Kuro2 
 
Abstract: This paper examines the effect of on-the-job training on the probability of finding a job. We 
reevaluate the existing training program using experimental data from the National Employment 
Service, 2013 and non-experimental data from the Labor Force Survey, 2013. Moreover, we employ 
the Propensity Score Matching method to estimate the training effect and to check its sensitivity to a 
different model specification and to different degrees of randomization. The results show that the 
average training effect on the treated is smaller and the reduction in the selection bias is higher when a 
different specification is used. Moreover, the effect is also sensitive to different degrees of 
randomization settings, i.e., the effect is smaller in a non-experimental setting compared to the quasi-
experimental setting. Hence, we conclude that the average training effect on the treated decreases if we 
increase the randomization of the treated group.  
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Introduction 
The employment promotion programmes (EPP), have gained a considerable 
attention by labor market institutions worldwide. In specific, on-the-job training is 
considered as a measure that would not only tackle unemployment, but would also 
contribute in the skills gap reduction among unemployed jobseekers. Cahuc and 
Zylberberg (2004) argue that training programs raise the overall quality of the 
workforce. However, in unemployment, investment in training is costlier 
(Mortensen, 1986). Hence, the financial constraint that training imposes to 
unemployed people might reduce the incentives to invest in their human capital. 
Becker (1964) suggests that this problem is solved by government intervention 
through subsidies. There are several examples from different countries that have 
implemented such interventions. In this paper we focus on training programmes, 
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specifically those implemented in European countries. Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) 
consider the American experience to be unimpressive in terms of the efficiency of 
the implemented subsidies.  
The literature concludes that there is a double effect of training on exiting from 
unemployment. One one hand, training programs are considered as layers of control 
by potential employers (Richardson & Van den Berg, 2002). On the other hand, 
training might increase the job seeker’s reservation wage, and this leads to longer 
unemployment spells (Fougère, Crépon & Ferraci, 2007). Nevertheless, other 
authors argue that the effect of training on unemployment duration might depend on 
timing. For instance, it is likely that in the short run, e.g., several weeks after the end 
of the training program, training incentivizes jobseekers to exit from unemployment 
(Fougère, Crépon & Ferraci, 2007; Richardson & Van den Berg, 2002). In addition, 
McGuinness, O’Connell and Kelly (2014) argue that in the long run, e.g., several 
months after training, the impact might disappear. Aside from timing, the effect of 
training on unemployment duration depends also on the nature of training. For 
instance, Smet (2012) argues that on-job-training raises the probability of 
employment or reemployment compared to job-search-training. Below, we present 
a few programmes implemented in Northern European countries. 
In Finland, the Työhön experiment (Job Search Programme, 1996-1976) was 
designed to subsidize the recently unemployed jobseekers to smooth their transition 
to employment, and prevent their mental health effects caused by the struggle to find 
a job (Hämäläinen, Uusitalo & Vuori, 2008). The programme aimed to help 
participants enhance their job search skills through job search training. Hämäläinen 
et al., 2008 argue that the recruitment (selection) was voluntary and the assignment 
into treatment (training) was random. That is, the participants chose to enter the 
program but they were randomly split into treatment and control groups. Using 
several propensity matching strategies, the authors find that the difference in 
employment rates between the treated and untreated ranges between negative 3 
percent and 30 percent.  
Similarly, in Sweeden, Björklund and Regnér (1996) evaluate the effect of a social 
experiment in the form of a job-search assistance for 410 unemployed jobseekers, 
randomly assigned into treatment and control groups. Those treated, participated in 
the training program for 7.5 hours on a weekly basis, and their counterparts received 
the treatment for only 1.5 hours/week. After 9 months, the rate of employment for 
the treated group was 13 percentage points higher than the employment rate of the 
control group.  
In Norway, Torp (1994) evaluates the effect of labor market training (LMT) on 
unemployment duration using non-experimental data of unemployed jobseekers. 
The treated group is drawn from the LMT 1989 survey and the untreated group (non-
participants) is randomly drawn from the stock of unemployed jobseekers in 1989. 
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The authors employ Tobit and Heckman two- step estimation models. Their results 
indicate that participation in training improves the employability of unemployed 
jobseekers. However, this applies only to short and long period trainings. The 
contrary is found for semi-long training courses.  
In Albania, the National Employment Service has provided a gamut of programmes 
targeting unemployed youth and vulnerable groups. In this work, we examine the 
effect of on-the-job training on exiting unemployment using a Propensity Score 
Matching approach. First, we reevaluate the existing program in a quasi-
experimental setting to check the sensitivity of the average training effect on the 
treated to a different model specification. Second, we rely on non-experimental 
methods by Dehija and Wahba (1999) to estimate the same effect and examine 
whether the effect is sensitive to different degrees of randomization. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section (2) provides a brief review of the existing 
on-the-job training program. Section (3) describes the empirical model and section 
(4) presents the data and the results of this study. Lastly, section (5) concludes and 
presents the motivation for future work.   
 
Review of Existing Programmes  
This section reviews ILO-EU-IPA (2014) final report: “Employment Promotion 
Programmes in Albania: An assessment of its quality in the formulation and 
implementation processes (2008-2014)”. Specifically, we reevaluate the effect of the 
training program on the probability of becoming employed using a different model 
specification. The employment promotion programme (EPP) we are interested in is 
that of on-the-job training, approved by the Council of Ministers, with Decision 
no.47 (CoM no. 47). The mechanism the program delves into reducing 
unemployment can be described as follows: the programme provides financial 
support to employers who offer a traineeship to jobseekers registered in the 
programme. The duration of on-job-training is approximately 6 months. 
Applications to the programme were submitted by employers. The unemployed 
jobseekers are selected by the National Employment Service (NES) and a brief 
profile of the potential participants into the program is submitted to the companies. 
In the report, it is mentioned that there is dissatisfaction from the side of employers 
regarding the low profile of the selected jobseekers. Moreover, there is a mismatch 
between the skills demand from the employers and the needs of jobseekers. This has 
an important implication concerning the design of the program. While NES offices 
selected discouraged jobseekers in order to improve their labor market situation, 
companies aimed at already skilled participants so that the chances to employ them 
after the programme would be higher. This is reflected in the reasons why companies 
applied to the programme: mainly to recruit highly skilled workforce (which goes in 
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line with Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) expectations) and to improve the quality of 
their business plans. Additionally, the largest number of recruitments is registered in 
the small sized companies, mainly those operating in the clothing confection and 
construction sectors, i.e., companies that would employ low-skilled job-seekers. All 
considered, the outcome, employment of the participants after the training 
programme, is biased towards the needs of the NES. 
Given the mechanism the program is designed, there are a few issues that require 
attention. First, ILO-EU-IPA (2014) argue that the treated group is not random. 
Second, there is self-selection into treatment from the side of the applicant and the 
employer. That is, the employers tend to select the already skilled jobseekers. Whilst 
voluntary participation is found to yield biased estimates owning to the participant’s 
unobserved motivation (Hämäläinen et al., 2008), entirely caseworker's assessment 
might lead to selection into treatment bias. Third, given that the program design 
assumes the features of a quasi-experiment rather than a social experiment, the true 
counterfactual does not exist (ILO-EU-IPA, 2014). However, given the lack of 
randomization, their control group is drawn from the same survey. To this extent, we 
consider non-experimental methods to reevaluate the training effect on employment 
outcomes. More on non-experimental methods is provided in section (4).  
 
Empirical Model 
The empirical framework of this work borrows from program evaluation methods 
which in the context of this study examine the effect of active labor market policies 
(ALMP) on the labor market position of unemployed jobseekers.1 Specifically, we 
employ Propensity Score Matching (PSM) non-parametric methods to evaluate the 
impact of on-job-training on the probability of finding a job.  
In essence, PSM is a mechanism that potentially solves the bias of selection into 
treatment. The latter arises when we want to identify the difference between the 
participant’s outcomes with and without treatment (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2005). 
Since we cannot simultaneously observe both outcomes, the matching idea is to 
construct a counterpart of the treated group, the control group, with similar pre-
treatment characteristics. Thus, the difference in the outcomes of the treated and 
control group will only be attributed to the programme (treatment). 
The empirical model builds on the work of Dehejia and Wahba (1999). Let X, be a 
vector of observable characteristics. Owing to the curse of dimensionality, we 
neglect exact matching. Thus, we rely on Roy-Rubin model of balancing scores b(X), 
where b is a function of X, such that the conditional distribution of X given the 
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balancing scores is independent of assignment into treatment. Let 𝒟i denote the 
assignment into treatment, i.e., 𝒟i is a binary treatment indicator as given by (1). 
𝒟𝑖 = {
⁡1, 𝑖⁡receives⁡treatment, 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁
0, otherwise
                  (1) 
The potential outcomes, e.g., employment status, are denoted by Yi(𝒟i). Hence, the 
treatment effect for the ith individual, can be written as:  
𝜏𝑖 = 𝑌𝑖(𝒟𝑖 = 1) − 𝑌𝑖(𝒟𝑖 = 0)                                       (2) 
Since we can only observe either Yi(1) or Yi(0), we fail in estimating the individual 
effect of treatment. Therefore, the parameter of interest would be the average 
treatment effect of the treated (ATT):  
𝜏𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝔼[𝜏|𝒟𝑖 = 1] = 𝔼[𝑌(1)|𝒟 = 1] − 𝔼[𝑌(0)|𝒟 = 1] ,                          (3) 
where the last term denotes the counterfactual outcome which is not observed. 
Coliendo and Kopeinig (2005) argue that using the mean outcome of untreated 
individuals,⁡𝔼[𝑌(0)|𝒟 = 0), is not the best measure to evaluate the ATT in non-
experimental studies. That is, the determinants of assignment into treatment would 
also determine the outcomes of interest, leading to self-selection bias. Using the 
mean outcome of the untreated group, we can define the bias as follows: 
𝔼[𝑌(1)|𝒟 = 1) − 𝔼[𝑌(0)|𝒟 = 0) = ⁡𝔼[𝑌(1)|𝒟 = 1] − 𝔼[𝑌(0)|𝒟 = 1]⏟                    
𝝉𝑨𝑻𝑻
+ 
+⁡𝔼[𝑌(0)|𝒟 = 1] − 𝔼[𝑌(0)|𝒟 = 0]⏟                      
𝒃𝒊𝒂𝒔
       (4)  
The true parameter, ATT, is identified only when the bias vanishes. Moreover, 
Deheija and Wahba (1999) argue that in social experiments where the treated group 
is fully randomized the bias is zero. To obtain consistency of the PSM estimator, a 
few assumptions are needed (see Proposition (1) and Corollary in Deheija & Wahba, 
1999). Let p(Xi) be the probability that i is assigned into treatment 𝒟i, or in other 
terms, the propensity score: 
𝑝(𝑿𝑖) ≡ Pr[𝒟𝑖 = 1|𝑿𝑖] = 𝔼[𝒟𝑖|𝑿𝑖] ∈ (0,1)     (5) 
Then, the conditional independence assumption tells that given X, unaffected by 
treatment, the potential outcomes are independent of assignment into treatment: 
 {(𝑌(0), 𝑌(1)) ⊥⊥ 𝒟𝑖}|𝑿𝑖 , ∀⁡𝑿𝑖       (6) 
and given 𝑝(𝑿𝑖): 
{(𝑌(0), 𝑌(1)) ⊥⊥ 𝒟𝑖}|𝑝(𝑿𝑖), ∀⁡𝑿𝑖      (7) 
Coliendo and Kopeinig (2005) define the expressions in (6) and (7) as the 
unconfoundness assumptions given X and the propensity scores, respectively. 
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Additionally, we could assume the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) 
which rules out the case(s) when the outcomes of untreated individuals are affected 
by the treatment of the treated. The last two issues before we proceed to estimation 
are the common support (overlap condition) and the PSM estimator. The overlap 
condition rules out perfect predictability of treatment given the covariates in X, i.e., 
𝑝(𝑿𝑖) ∈ (0,1)⁡as shown in Eq.(5). Lastly, the PSM estimator, ATT, can be written 
as:  
𝜏𝐴𝑇𝑇
𝑃𝑆𝑀|𝒟=1 = 𝔼{𝔼[𝑌𝑖|𝒟𝑖 = 1, 𝑝(𝑿𝑖)] − 𝔼[𝑌𝑖|𝒟𝑖 = 0, 𝑝(𝑿𝑖)]|𝒟𝑖 = 1}  (8) 
To provide more intuition about the mechanism the PSM works, we apply the law 
of iterated expectations to Eq.(4), assuming that the bias is zero, and rewrite it as 
follows: 
𝜏𝐴𝑇𝑇|𝒟=1 = 𝔼{𝔼[𝑌𝑖|𝑿𝑖, 𝒟𝑖 = 1] − 𝔼[𝑌𝑖|𝑿𝑖 , 𝒟𝑖 = 0]|𝒟𝑖 = 1}    (9) 
Deheija and Wahba (1999) argue that the PSM estimator conditions on the 
propensity scores rather than the covariates of 𝑿. This intermediate step is possible 
owing to the unconfoundedness assumption (7), which tells that the distribution of 
the covariates in X is the same for observations with the same propensity score. 
Hence, the intermediate step solves the curse of dimensionality.  
 
Data and Estimation Strategy 
In this paper, the approach to randomize the treated group borrows from non-
experimental methods (Dehejia & Wahba, 1999). Given that the labor force 
participation survey (LFS) of 2012-2013 in Albania was conducted at the same time 
with the CoM no.47 survey, we randomly draw a sample of unemployed jobseekers 
from the LFS with similar characteristics as the initial control group. This would 
reduce the heterogeneity among groups, i.e., the labor market conditions would the 
same given the timing the data was collected. However, the limitation in this case is 
the insufficient number of draws. That is, we drop from the sample all individuals 
who did not participate in any training program during the year the survey was 
conducted. The total number of replacements is 146. Nevertheless, since we aim to 
perform a sensitivity analysis of ATT, we estimate the effect of training on 
employment in both quasi and non-experimental settings. 
 
Sample Characteristics 
The following analysis presents the sample characteristics of the original treated and 
control group. In addition, we perform mean test comparison to check whether the 
two groups are statistically indistinguishable (Table 1). The sample contains 
information on 1149 registered jobseekers from which 932 are treated and 217 are 
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untreated. The majority of jobseekers registered in the programme are women. 
Regarding gender, the treated group is indistinguishable from the control group. 
However, there is statistical difference in the age of both groups. The same is 
concluded regarding their education attainment. While the majority in the treated 
group have earned a primary or lower secondary education degree, most of the 
untreated jobseekers are graduates from general high school programs. The mean 
comparison tests indicate that at most of the matching covariates, the treated and 
untreated are not statistically indistinguishable. Therefore, matching methods are 
necessary. 
Mean comparison tests  
Covariates (X) 
Treated Untreated  
Nr. % Nr. % p-value 
Sex 932 100.0 217 100.0   
Female 528 56.7 135 62.2 0.136 
Male 404 43.3 82 37.8 0.136 
Age            
15-19 33 3.5 28 12.9 0.000 
20-24 387 41.5 38 17.5 0.000 
25-34 267 28.6 60 27.6 0.769 
35-44 146 15.7 54 24.9 0.001 
45+ 99 10.6 37 17.1 0.008 
Education           
Primary + lower secondary 484 51.9 93 42.9 0.016 
Upper secondary - Vocational 49 5.3 3 1.4 0.013 
Upper secondary - General 381 40.9 119 54.8 0.000 
University 18 1.9 2 0.9 0.306 
Estimation strategy (matching choice) 
Regarding the estimation strategy, we consider the following issues. First, our model 
choice is logit over linear probability model. The former would violate the overlap 
condition since the values of p(X) would lie outside of the unit interval. Second, the 
variable choice should satisfy the conditional independence assumption. To this 
extent, there are several differences in our variable selection compared to the 
matching covariates used by ILO-EU-IPA (2014). Our variable selection is based on 
the statistical significance, as one of the selection criterion suggested in Coliendo 
and Kopeinig (2005). Third, our matching algorithm is the nearest neighbor (NN) 
with replacement. The mechanism how the NN works is straightforward. For each 
treated individual i from 1 to N, we assign a neighbor h(i) to the control group such 
that the difference in (10) in minimized.  
ℎ(𝑖) = argmin
ℎ
⁡[?̂? (𝑿ℎ) − ?̂?(𝑿𝑖)]     (10) 
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Whilst the NN with replacement reduces the bias and increases the overall matching 
quality, it might also increase the variance since an untreated jobseeker is used more 
than once as a match. This is a two-step estimation. In the first step, we estimate the 
logistic model of treatment predictability. In the second step, we estimate the non-
parametric regression conditional on the propensity scores from the first step. Table 
(2) presents the logit results of assignment into treatment from the quasi-
experimental and non-experimental settings.  
First step: logit results of assignment into treatment 
Covariates (X) 
quasi-experimental non-experimental 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Male 0.369 0.023 -0.8 0.000 
Agea (35+)     
age15-24 0.883 0.000 - - 
age 25-34 0.445 0.022 - - 
Ageb (45+)     
age15-19 - - -0.03 0.939 
age 20-24 - - 2.81 0.000 
age 25-34 - - 1.96 0.000 
age 35-44 - - 1.54 0.000 
Educationa (secondary +)     
Primary Education 0.359 0.021 - - 
Educationb (primary)     
Secondary - - 0.358 0.094 
Tertiary - - -2.24 0.000 
Unemployment Durationa -0.018 0.910   
Unemp. Durb (Long term) -  -0.76 0.001 
Unemployment Benefits -0.441 0.533 - - 
Constant 0.692 0.000 1.31 0.000 
Total observations 1149  1078  
Pseudo R2   0.03  0.22   
a) denotes the specification of the same variable in quasi-experimental matching 
b) denotes the specification of the same variable in non-experimental matching 
- reference category in parentheses 
While males have higher odds of receiving the treatment in the quasi-experimental 
setting, females are more likely to participate in the training program when non-
experimental data are used. In both settings, younger jobseekers (specifically, those 
aged from 15-34 in the quasi-experimental setting and those aged from 20 to 44 in 
the other setting) are more likely to receive the treatment. Regarding schooling, the 
likelihood of participation in the programme is higher for those with low levels of 
education. Despite the measurement of unemployment duration, i.e., in levels 
(months) for the quasi-experimental setting and a dummy indicator of short/long 
term duration in the non-experimental setting, it is evident that those with longer 
ISSN: 2065-0175                                                                                              ŒCONOMICA 
149 
unemployment spells are more likely to receive the treatment. As expected, 
unemployment benefits do not affect the assignment into treatment.  
To assess the quality of matching, Coliendo and Kopeinig (2005) propose the Pseudo 
R2. In the non-experimental setting, the value of Pseudo R2, shows that the 
observable characteristics predict 22 percent of the participation probability. In 
contrast, the predictability indicator for the quasi-experimental setting is only 3 
percent. Hence, the matching quality is higher when we use non-experimental data. 
Alternatively, the common support tests (see Table A1 & A2 in Appendices), 
associated with the distribution of the treated and untreated after matching (see 
Figure A1 & A2 in Appendices) confirms the same result. Nevertheless, we fail in 
rejecting null hypothesis under balanced matching in both cases at the 1 percent 
level.  
Given that the overlap condition is satisfied, it is safe to proceed to the second step: 
estimation of the average treatment effect on the treated (Table 3). Regarding the 
quasi-experimental setting, the ATT is 0.39. That is, participation in the training 
program increases the probability of finding a job after treatment by 39 percent. The 
estimate reported by ILO-EU-IPA (2014) is 0.55. Hence, we find that within the 
same setting, the ATT estimate is considerably sensitive to model specification. 
Moreover, the large effect of 0.55 might be overestimated owing to the unobservable 
heterogeneity or the considerable skills gap among the treated and control groups. 
The ATT estimate for the non-experimental setting is 0.33, i.e., on-job-training 
increases employment chances by 33 percent. The comparison of the quasi-
experimental and non-experimental ATT estimates indicates that the effect of 
training is also sensitive to the degree of randomization of the treated group.  
Second step: average treatment effect on the treated 
Outcome Sample  Treated Controls Difference S.E. t-stat 
quasi-
experimental       
Employment 
status 
Unmatched 1.541 1.046 0.496 0.034 14.35 
ATT 1.541 1.149 0.393 0.093 4.21 
non-experimental       
Employment status 
Unmatched .4518 .1496 0.3921 0.042 9.17 
ATT .5418 .2081 0.334 0.103 3.21 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we aim to reevaluate the effect of on-job-training on exiting 
unemployment using experimental and non-experimental methods. Moreover, we 
aim to check the sensitivity of the effect to different model specifications and 
different degrees of randomization using the same estimation strategy. The 
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reevaluated average training effect on the treated is considerably smaller (23 
percentage points lower) when we use a different model specification. In addition, 
the quality of matching and the reduction of the selection bias (within the same 
matching algorithm) are higher. The ATT estimate in a non-experimental setting is 
6 percentage points lower than the estimate in the quasi-experimental setting, i.e., 
the estimate is sensitive to different degrees of randomization of the treated group. 
In this paper we omit the problem of unobserved heterogeneity (e.g., previous labor 
market experience, motivation to work and proximity to the employer offering the 
training among other factors) as there is data limitation in the quasi-experimental 
survey. However, more robust estimations would concern future research. 
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Appendices 
Common support test to check whether matching is balanced for the quasi-
experimental setting 
Table A1. Common support test 
Variable Treated  Control %bias  p-value 
Male .43348  .43133 0.4  0.926 
age 15-24 .45064  .44957 0.2  0.963 
age 25-34 .28648  .28541 0.2  0.959 
Primary Education .59131  .51824 0.2  0.963 
Unemployment Duration .61052  .60086 2.0  0.670 
Unemployment Benefits .00751  .00107 6.3  0.034 
H0: Matching is balanced 
Ha: Matching is not balanced 
P>chi2 : 0.503 : failed in rejecting H0 
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Common support test to check whether matching is balanced for the non-
experimental setting 
Table A2. Common support test 
Variable Treated  Control %bias  p-value 
Male .43348  .44099 -1.5  0.744 
age 15-19 .03541  .02468 3.7  0.175 
age 20-24 .41524  .41416 0.3  0.963 
age 25-34 .28648  .28326 0.8  0.878 
35-44 .15665  .16524 -2.5  0.614 
Secondary .46137  .5118 -10.4  0.029 
Tertiary .01931  .01395 2.2  0.365 
Unemployment Duration .61052  .62124 -2.3  0.634 
H0: Matching is balanced 
Ha: Matching is not balanced 
P>chi2 : 0.404 : failed in rejecting H0 
Distribution of treated and untreated cases after matching  
 
 
Figure A1. Quasi-experimental 
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Figure A2. Quasi-experimental 
  
